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CIVIL CLAIMS OF ADULTS MOLESTED AS
CHILDREN: MATURATION OF HARM AND
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HURDLE
The horror of incest is not in the sexual act, but in the exploitation
of children and the corruption of parental love.'
I. Introduction
Adults who have been the victims of childhood incest abuse2
1. J. HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 4 (1981).
2. For purposes of this Note, the term "incest abuse" refers to all unwanted
and nonconsensual sexual contact between family members. See D. RUSSELL, THE
SECRET TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LIVES OF GIRLS AND WOMEN 59 (1986) [hereinafter
SECRET TRAUMA]. Incestuous abuse involves "any kind of exploitive sexual contact
or attempted sexual contact that occur[s] between relatives, no matter how distant
the relationship, before the victim turnis] eighteen years old." Id. For related
definitions of acts constituting child sexual abuse under the New York Penal
Law, Family Court Act and Social Services Law, see THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF
CHILDREN I app. at 15-19 (1987) (R. Cohen & M. McCabe ed. 1987) (published
by the New York State Department of Social Services in conjunction with the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, First Department)
(child sexual abuse typified by nonconsensual sexual contact, and a child less
than 17 years of age is legally incapable of consent to any sex offense under
New York State Penal Law § 130.05) [hereinafter SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN];
see also GUIDELINES FOR REPORTING SEXUAL ABUSE AND MALTREATMENT OF
CHILDREN 1 (1986) (official guidelines of the State of New York Department of
Health and Department of Social Services) (sexually abused child is a child less
than 18 years of age whose parent, or other person legally responsible for his
care, commits or allows to be commited a sexual offense, as defined in the Penal
Law, on such child).
One researcher surveyed a random sample of 930 women in San Francisco and
reported prevalence rates of 16016 for incest abuse occuring before the victim
reached the age of 18, and 12% for incest abuse before the victim reached the
age of 14. See SECRET TRAUMA, supra, at 60. After combining the prevalence
statistics for physical and nonphysical (noncontact) abuse with the rates for
intrafamilial and extrafamilial sexual abuse, this study reported an overall prev-
alence rate of 38% of physical sexual abuse and 54% of noncontact abuse. See
id. at 61-62.
In another study, reviewing 583 cases of child sexual abuse, the offender was
a family member in 47% of the cases. See Note, The Testimony of Child Victims
in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806,
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have recently begun to seek civil redress3 for latent injuries' caused
by such abuse. Because courts have failed to recognize a tort of
807 n.14 (1985). Moreover, it has been estimated that 75% of the incest occurring
between family members involves incest between fathers and daughters. See Cole-
man, Incest: A Proper Definition Reveals the Need for a Different Legal Response,
49 Mo. L. REV. 251, 251 n.1 (1984); see also Arthur, Child Sexual Abuse:
Improving the System's Response, 37 Juv. & FAm. CT. J. 4 (1986) [hereinafter
Arthur]; Note, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's
Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189, 193 n.18 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Preserving
the Victim's Remedy].
The incidence of child sexual abuse in New York has been ascertained through
reports of child abuse and maltreatment made to the New York State Child Abuse
and Maltreatment Register. See McCabe, Dynamics of Child Sexual Abuse, in
SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN, supra, at 1-2 (reporting 197% rise in sexual abuse
reports in New York State during seven year period ending 1985, from 2,346
reports in 1979 to 6,963 reports in 1985) [hereinafter McCabe]. McCabe notes,
however, that the true incidence of child sexual abuse may far exceed the current
reporting levels. See id. at 3.
McCabe also has compiled separate data on the incidence of incest abuse in
New York through a random sample of 201 child sexual abuse cases reported
to the Child Protective Services agency in New York City. See McCabe, supra,
at 5. McCabe reports: (1) 86% of the cases involve female victims, see id. at 5-
7, at an average age of 10.9 at the time of the abuse, see id. at 6, 8; (2) 54%
of the cases involve offenders who are fathers or father-figures, see id. at 9-10;
(3) 29% of the cases occur over an extended period of time, see id. at 16-17;
and (4) 28% of the cases involve intercourse as the most frequently committed
sexual act against the victim. See id. at 14-15.
For a discussion of the prevalence of child sexual abuse in general, see D.
FINKELHOR, A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 20-21 (1986) (referring to
19 studies taking place from 1929 to 1985) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK]; McCabe,
supra, at 3 (indicating 200% increase nationwide in reported sexual abuse cases
from 1976 through 1982); Brody, Therapists Seek Causes of Child Molesting,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1987, at Cl, col. I (referring to 1985 national poll which
indicates: (1) between 10.9 and 17.6 million American men have sexually abused
a child; and (2) 27% of women and 16% of men have been molested as children;
see also Watson, Lubenow, Greenberg, King & Junkin, A Hidden Epidemic,
NEWSWEEK, May 14, 1984, at 30 (similar statistics); Bailey, Grueling Child-Abuse
Cases Push Many Prosecutors to Their Limits, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1986, at
35, col. 4 (reporting that nationwide the number of reported child molestation
cases has jumped seventeen-fold since 1976 to more than 100,000).
3. See Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 73, 727 P.2d 226, 226-27 (1986);
see also Smith v. Smith, No. 85 Civ. 285E, slip op. at I (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 7,
1986) (memorandum and order granting defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment based on statute of limitations); Note, Preserving the Victim's Remedy,
supra note 2, at 204 n.96; Galente, New War on Child Abuse, Nat'l L.J., June
25, 1984, at 26, cols. 2-3 (reporting that child molestation cases have prompted
"adult survivor" suits).
While parents may attempt to raise the defense of parent tort immunity in
response to the civil claims filed by their children, the parental immunity doctrine
has been abandoned in whole or in part by a substantial number of jurisdictions.
See Rousey v. Rousey, 499 A.2d 1199, 1201-2 (D.C. 1985) (summarizing positions
that various jurisdictions have taken with respect to abrogating parent tort im-
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incest, plaintiffs are most often confined to the traditional inten-
tional tort and negligence causes of action5 including assault, bat-
tery, false imprisonment and infliction of mental distress. These
causes of action, usually governed by a one6 to three7 year statute
of limitations period, often require the incest victim to commence
suit before the injury occurs.
New York, as a general rule, computes statutes of limitations
for personal injury claims from the date the plaintiff's cause of
action accrues.' For tort purposes, courts fix the time of accrual
as the date the defendant's wrongful conduct occurs rather than
the date the plaintiff discovers the injury or the date the plaintiff
recognizes a causal relationship between the injury and the defend-
ant's conduct. 9 While personal injury statutes of limitations or-
dinarily begin to run from the date of the injury (i.e., date of
accrual), the statutory period is tolled by the plaintiff's infancy or
insanity.10 Nevertheless, the plaintiff, under a strict interpretation
munity doctrine). New York eliminated the doctrine in GeIbman v.. Gelbman, 23
N.Y.2d 434, 439, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 532 (1969).
4. See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the latent
or long-range. injuries associated with incest abuse.
5. See Note, Tort Remedies For Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REV. 609, 617-28 (1983); Note, Preserving the Victim's Remedy, supra note 2,
at 189-90; Note, Adult Incest Survivors and the Statute of Limitations: The
Delayed Discovery Rule and Long-Term Damages, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 191,
195 n.28 (1985).
6. New York Civil Practice Law § 215(3) provides that "an action to recover
damages for assault, battery [or] false imprisonment" shall be commenced within
one year. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 215(3) (McKinney 1972).
7. New York Civil Practice Law § 214(5) provides that "an action to recover
damages for personal injury except as provided in sections 214-b, 214-c and 215"
must be commenced within three years. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 214(5)
(McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987); see also N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 214(5)
practice commentary at 308 (McKinney Supp. 1987) (noting that § 215(3) applies
to those actions in which the defendant evinces intent to affect plaintiff, whereas
§ 214(5) governs negligence actions in which the defendant evinces no such intent)..
8. New York Civil Practice Law § 203(a) provides that "[tlhe time within
which an action must be commenced, except as otherwise expressly prescribed,
shall be computed from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the
claim is interposed." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 203(a) (McKinney 1972).
9. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 203(a) practice commentary at 111-14, 57,
(McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987) (observing that although United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has advocated discovery rule, the New York Court
of Appeals has consistently refused to adopt such rule, choosing instead to defer
to legislature); see also I J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL
PRACTICE 201.02 (1963 & Supp. 1986) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER].
10. New York Civil Practice Law § 208 provides, in pertinent part:
19871
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of the applicable New York law," has at best three years upon
reaching the age of eighteen 2 to commence suit against the sexually
abusive family member. Many of the effects of childhood incest
abuse, however, take years to manifest themselves,13 thus rendering
such tolling exceptions of little practical use to the victim of
childhood incest litigating as an adult.14
Most jurisdictions have adopted some form of a discovery rule 5
in an attempt to solve the difficulty of maintaining a cause of
action when the wrongful act and injury do not occur simultaneously
or when the plaintiff is incapable of discovering the injury within
the statutory period. The discovery rule provides that a cause of
action accrues for statute of limitations purposes at the time the
plaintiff, using reasonable diligence, discovers the injury. 16 New
York, long in the minority of jurisdictions in failing to extend a
discovery rule beyond a limited number of circumstances, 7 now
If a person entitled to commence an action is under a disability because
of infancy or insanity at the time the cause of action accrues, and the
time otherwise limited for commencing the action is three years or more
and expires no later than three years after the disability ceases, or the
person under the disability dies, the time within which the action must
be commenced shall be extended to three years after the disability ceases
or the person under the disability dies, whichever event first occurs;
if the time otherwise limited is less than three years, the time shall be
extended by the period of disability.
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 208 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
11. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
12. Section 208 was amended on Sept. 1, 1974, to lower the age of majority
from 21 to 18. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 208 (McKinney Supp. 1987); see
also id. § 1050) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
13. See infra notes 47-68 and accompanying text.
14. See id.
15. See Note, Toward A Time-Of-Discovery Rule For The Statute Of Limi-
tations In Latent Injury Cases In New York State, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 113,
118 n.41, 120 n.45 (1985) (distinguishing those jurisdictions that have legislatively
adopted a time of discovery rule from those states that have judicially provided
for discovery rule). The author found a total of forty-seven jurisdictions with
some form of a discovery rule. See id. at 120.
16. See Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 432, 248 N.E.2d
871, 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 27 (1969) (foreign object exception); Dobbins v.
Clifford, 39 A.D.2d 1, 3-4, 330 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746-47 (4th Dep't 1972) (extending
Flanagan to negligently performed surgery); see also Note, Statutes of Limitations
and the Discovery Rule in Latent Injury Claims: An Exception or the Law?, 43
U. PITT. L. REV. 501, 502 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Exception or the Law?].
17. See, e.g., Martin v. Edwards Laboratories, 60 N.Y.2d 417, 457 N.E.2d
1150, 469 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1983); Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d
1008, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1981), cert. denied sub nom. Rosenberg
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 456 U.S. 967 (1982); Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp.,
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provides a discovery rule for for those plaintiffs suffering from
the latent effects of exposure to toxic substances."8
Currently, the question has arisen whether the adult victim of
childhood incest abuse can successfully litigate civil claims based
on negligence and intentional tort by invoking common law doc-
trines and statutory tolling exceptions relating to statutes of lim-
itations.19 This question inevitably raises the additional issue of
whether an incest victim, litigating as an adult, should be afforded
the benefit of the discovery rule. 20 It is suggested that the discovery
rule and its rationale are equally applicable to the incest victim's
civil claims, for the injuries resulting from childhood sexual abuse
often remain hidden from detection.2 Thus, the incest plaintiff is
as "blamelessly ignorant ' 22 of the fact of injury as the victim of
a toxic tort and is, therefore, equally deserving of the discovery
rule's benefits.
This Note, focusing on New York law, demonstrates that the
statute of limitations is the primary procedural difficulty that adult
victims of childhood incest abuse encounter in bringing their civil
claims. 21 Specifically, the traditionally short statutes of limitations
for assault, battery and infliction of mental distress often preclude
the adult victim of childhood incest from seeking a remedy within
the statutorily prescribed time. 24 Part II of this Note presents an
overview of the nature of incest abuse and its resultant injuries 5
and considers the purposes and policies behind statutes of limi-
47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Schwartz v. Heyden
Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963);
Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936).
For those situations in which New York has adopted some form of a discovery
rule for accrual purposes, see N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 213(5) (McKinney
1972) (action by state for spoilation of public property); id. § 213(8) (McKinney
1972 & Supp. 1987) (action based on fraud); id. § 214(7) (McKinney 1972 &
Supp. 1987) (action to annul marriage based on fraud); id. § 214-a (McKinney
Supp. 1987) (malpractice discovery exceptions for foreign objects); id. § 214-b
(McKinney Supp. 1987) (agent orange exception for Vietnam veterans); id., 214-c
(McKinney Supp. 1987) (action for toxic tort injuries).
18. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1987).
19. See infra notes 88-169 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
22. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949) (plaintiff contracting silicosis
after inhaling silica dust in workplace).
23. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
24. See id.
25. See infra notes 36-68 and accompanying text.
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tations. 26 Part II also sets out the various common law counter-
measures and statutory tolling exceptions 27 to statutes of limitations,
including the discovery rule. 2 Next, Part III evaluates these common
law doctrines and tolling exceptions to determine whether they are
applicable to incest-based tort claims.29
Based on this analysis, the Note argues that New York's common
law doctrines of equitable estoppelP and duress,3 as well as its
statutory tolling exception for mental disability,3 2 if properly con-
strued, would ordinarily enable the incest victim to prevail against
a defendant's. assertion of a statute of limitations defense.3 Because
courts. tend to construe these doctrines and exceptions narrowly,
however, Part III of this Note concludes that New York should
enact a discovery rule applicable to incest-based tort victims.34
Finally, in Part IV, the Note offers a proposed statute that addresses
the particular difficulty that adult victims of childhood incest abuse
encounter in seeking civil redress for their injuries.35
II. Background: Incest Abuse and Statutes of Limitations
As a backdrop for the legal analysis of the procedural difficulties
that adult victims of childhood incest face in litigating their civil
claims, this section will: (1) discuss the nature of incest abuse and
its resultant injuries; and (2) present an overview of the purposes
and policies behind statutes of limitations.
A. The Nature and Effects of Incestuous Abuse
Regardless of the desires that impel the offender to commit
incest,3 6 there are certain hallmarks of intrafamilial sexual abuse.37
26. See infra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 88-169 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 175-200 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 95-132 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 133-52 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 153-69 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 124-200 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 202-204 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 207-17 and accompanying text.
36. The most widespread form of incest has been called "true endogamous
incest," and is typified by the father who seeks out a sexual relationship with
his daughter because of his belief that nurturance and affection is unavailable
from other sources, particularly his spouse. The father's need for emotional
contact rather than sexual gratification per se is the distinguishing feature of this
[Vol. XV
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Dr. Judith Herman, a noted expert in father-daughter incest at
Harvard Medical School, summarizes the characteristics of such
incest abuse:
Incestuous abuse usually begins when the child is between the
ages of six and twelve, though cases involving younger children,
including infants, have been reported. The sexual contact typ-
ically begins with fondling and gradually proceeds to mastur-
bation and oral-genital contact. Vaginal intercourse is not usually
attempted until the child reaches puberty. Physical violence is
not often employed, since the overwhelming authority of the
parent is usually sufficient to gain the child's compliance. The
sexual contact becomes a compulsive behavior for the father,
whose need to preserve sexual access to his daughter becomes
form of incest. See Sturkie, Treating Incest Victims and Their Families, in INCEST
AS CHILD ABUSE: RESEARCH AND APPLICATIONS 132-33 (B. VanderMey & R. Neff
ed. 1986).
Another form of incest with primarily nonsexual roots has been termed "im-
perious incest," and is motivated by the father's need to dominate and control
his family sphere and to function as "emperor" within it. Id. at 134-35. Other
researchers have found that families which are "father-dominant mysoginistic"
have a higher incidence of incest. Id. at 135. The occurrence of incest in these
families stems primarily from the father's fear and hatred of women. See id.
Unable to express his anger towards his spouse, the father dominates and punishes
his daughter with sexual liasons. Id.
Finally, several forms of incest are primarily motivated and maintained by the
father's sexual preference for children. See id. at 135-37. They include pedophilic
incest, so-called "perverse incest" and child rape. Id. In each of these forms of
incest,/the offender is preoccupied with children as a source of sexual gratification
and may seek to involve the child in other deviant sexual practices. See id.; see
also A. BAXTER, TECHNIQUES FOR DEALING WITH CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 18-19
(1986) (indicating five theories of intrafamilial sexual abuse including sexually
permissive family dynamics and practices, as well as role confusion between
parents and between parent and child) [hereinafter BAXTER]; McCabe, supra note
2, at 20-25 (referring to seven factors leading to sexual abuse of children including
learned abusive behavior from generation to generation, poor communication
among family members, role reversal, social isolation of family within community
and poor parental supervision); Arthur, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing theories
advaned on basis of clinical experience with incarcerated offenders).37. Although incest abuse is perpetrated by male and female family members
alike, this Note focuses on incest abuse by male family members, a phenomenon
more frequently documented by psychological researchers. See D. CLEVELAND,
INCEST: THE STORY OF THREE WOMEN 3 (1986) [hereinafter CLEVELAND]; SOURCE-
BOOK, supra note 2, at 22-27; Finkelhor, Implications for Theory, Research and
Practice, in PREVENTING CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 133, 141 (M. Nelson & K. Clark
ed. 1986).
For the purposes of this Note, a "father" may be defined as a natural parent
as well as a foster, adoptive or step-parent, and may extend to any male who
lives with the child and assumes a caretaking role with respect to the child.
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the organizing principle of family life. The sexual contact is
usually repeated in secrecy for years, ending only when the child
finds the resources to escape. The child victim keeps the secret,
fearing that if she tells she will not be believed, she will be
punished, or she will destroy the family.,8
Similarly, the incidence and prevalence of incest abuse, as well as
its effects, are well documented.3 9 Empirical studies on the effects
of incest abuse have been collected from a wide range of public
and private sources, 40 reflecting a broad sample of adult, adolescent
and child respondents. 4' The specific psychological impact of the
incest abuse will vary from case to case, 42 depending on the age43
of the incest victim when the abuse begins, the frequency or duration
of its occurrence, 4 4 the type of sexual act involved 45 and the ag-
gressive or sadistic nature of the abuse.4 6 The most commonly
reported long-term effects suffered by adult victims of incest abuse
include depression 4 7 self-mutilation and suicidal behavior, 4 eating
38. Herman, Recognition and Treatment of Incestuous Families, 5 INT'L J.
FAm. THERAPY 81, 82 (C. Barnard ed. 1983) (special issue on families, incest
and therapy); see also BAXTER, supra note 36, at 33; McCabe, supra note 2, at
18-19.
39. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 20-21 (discussing 19 prevalence studies
of child sexual abuse). Finkelhor noted that "incidence" studies are attempts to
estimate the number of new cases occurring in a given time; "prevalence" studies,
on the other hand, attempt to estimate the proportion of a population that has
been sexually abused during childhood. Id. at 16. For a summary of the clinical
studies of incidence of intrafamilial sexual abuse, see id. at 17. For a summary
of the empirical data documenting the effects of incest abuse, see id. at 145-46;
see also BAXTER, supra note 36, at 23-24; Arthur, supra note 2, at 4-5.
40. Sources for research samples have included community drug treatment
centers, sexual assault centers, health centers, random and college samples, court
records, recruitment from prostitution arrest records, recruitment through mental
health agencies, clients in therapy, as well as other clinical referrals and records.
See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 145-46.
41. See id.
42. Finkelhor has distinguished between initial and long-term effects of child-
hood sexual abuse. See id. 144-63. He defines initial effects as those reactions
occurring within two years of the termination of the abuse. See id. at 144. He
states the initial effects reported in clinical literature include sleeping and eating
disturbances, phobias, guilt, shame, anger, and heightened sexual precocity. See
id. at 147-52.
43. See id. at 171-72; see also BAXTER, supra note 36, at 25 (observing that
children seem to recover more easily from "stranger initiated" sexual abuse than
from intrafamilial abuse).
44. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 165-67.
45. See id. at 168-69.
46. See id. at 169-70.
47. See id. at 152.
48. See id. at 154.
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disorders and sleep disturbances, 49 drug or alcohol abuse,50 sexual
dysfunction, 5 inability to form intimate relationships,5 2 tendencies
towards promiscuity and prostitution" and a vulnerability towards
revictimization .54
Mental health professionals and researchers have also found that
incest victims often meet the diagnostic criteria for Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD). 55 PTSD is a clinically diagnosed mental
disorder 6 in which the victim avoids situations that stimulate recall
of traumatic events or experiences.57 The victim attempts to repress
psychologically unacceptable experiences until a later time in life
when it might be possible to cope with them.58 An adult who has
been incestuously abused during infancy and childhood may develop
PTSD as a way of coping with the magnitude of the trauma
associated with prolonged incest abuse.5 9 Similarly, the incest victim
often avoids situations that remind her of the abuse and that, in
turn, trigger restimulation of the unresolved traumas. The psychic
difficulties associated with re-experiencing the trauma of past in-
cestuous abuse might, for instance, prevent an incest victim from
taking civil action against the offender within the applicable statute
of limitations period. 60
Incest victims suffering from PTSD may also present the symp-
toms of lack of sexual response, depression, suicidal tendencies,
promiscuity and alcohol and substance abuse. 6' By definition, PTSD
is a disorder that manifests itself after the stressful event and, in
the case of PTSD with delayed onset, often commences during
49. See id. at 155.
50. See id. at 162.
51. See id. at 159.
52. See id. at 157-58.
53. See id. at 160-61.
54. See id. at 158.
55. Donaldson & Gardner, Diagnosis & Treatment of Traumatic Stress Among
Women After Childhood Incest, in TRAUMA AND ITS WAKE: THE STUDY AND
TREATMENT OF POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 356 (C. Figley ed. 1985) [here-
inafter Donaldson & Gardner].
56. C. SCRIGNAR, POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT,
AND LEGAL ISSUES 9-10 (1984).
57. See id. at 26.
58. Donaldson & Gardner, supra note 55, at 370.
59. See id. at 361.
60. See Complaint at 4, Smith v. Smith, No. 85 Civ. 285E (W.D.N.Y. filed
Feb. 22, 1985).
61. Donaldson & Gardner, supra note 55, at 362-63.
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adulthood. 62 Thus, the mental injury of PTSD and its symptoms
may be neither discovered nor treated until years after the incidents
of abuse occurred.
Clinical research also shows a clear relationship between childhood
incest abuse and the tendency for victims to dissociate 63 and, more
seriously, to develop multiple personality disorder (MPD). 64 MPD,
like PTSD, is an elaborate defense mechanism utilized to block
the memory of experiences too painful to recall. 65 Little evidence
suggests a biological cause for multiple personality disorder, in-
dicating that its etiology is primarily environmental. 66 Most im-
portantly, while the onset of the disorder is early, 67 diagnosis does
not usually occur until the third or fourth decade of life. 68 Thus,
62. See id. at 362.
63. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 155.
64. Braun & Sachs, The Development of Multiple Personality Disorder: Pre-
disposing, Precipitating, and Perpetuating Factors, in CHILDHOOD ANTECEDENTS
OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY 37, 46-47 (R. Kluft ed. 1985) [hereinafter Braun &
Sachs]; Goodwin, Credibility Problems in Multiple Personality Disorder Patients
and Abused Children, in CHILDHOOD ANTECEDENTS OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY 1,
2-7 (R. Kluft ed. 1985); Putnam, Dissociation as a Response to Extreme Trauma,
in CHILDHOOD ANTECEDENTS OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY 65, 76-77 (R. Kluft ed.
1985) [hereinafter Putnam]; Wilbur, The Effect of Child Abuse on the Psyche,
in CHILDHOOD ANTECEDENTS OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY 21, 29 (R. Kluft ed. 1985);
see also Arthur, supra note 2, at 4; Note, Preserving the Victim's Remedy, supra
note 2, at 201-202 nn.88-90.
Braun & Sachs summarize the nature of multiple personality disorder as follows:
Multiple personality disorder is one of five dissociative disorders de-
lineated in the current DSM-III [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed. 1980)]. The common feature of all dissociative
disorders is a spontaneous and temporary fluctuation in the normal
integrative functions and consciousness. In multiple personality disorder,
this feature manifests itself as a temporary alteration in awareness of
one's identity. Instead of sustaining an ongoing continuity of identity,
afflicted individuals may assume a new identity or personality. Often,
an alter personality will be aware of the original or "host" personality.
However, the "host" personality usually claims to be unaware of the
existence of other personalities. In addition, information acquired while
the other personalities had executive control of the body may not be
accessible to the "host" personality.
See Braun & Sachs, supra note 64, at 40.
65. See Bowman, Blix & Coons, Multiple Personality in Adolescence: Rela-
tionship to Incestual Experiences, J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 109 (1985).
66. See id. at 112.
67. Putnam has found that the period of vulnerability to develop multiple
personality disorder extends from age 6 months to 12 years. See Putnam, supra
note 64, at 77.
68. See id. at 80. Putnam has found that multiple personality disorder tends
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the adult victim of childhood incest who develops MPD effectively
blocks out a recognition of the cause of her injury and may in
fact fail to recognize that -she is injured at all, because of the
fragmentation of her personality into alternates with varying levels
of awareness of the incest abuse.
B. The Policies and Purposes of Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations are legislative enactments prescribing fixed
periods of time within which legal rights are actionable. 69 The
limitations period for any given cause of action is said to commence
when the right "accrues" or comes into existence. 70 In the absence
of legislative definition, a cause of action "accrues" when the
plaintiff can first maintain the action.7 It has thus been largely
left to the judiciary to determine at what point the statutory period
begins to run. 72 In cases of personal injury, for instance, the cause
of action accrues from the time of injury or, stated otherwise,
from the date the defendant's wrongful conduct occurs. 7 Despite
the judiciary's role in determining when causes of action accrue,
it is within the exclusive authority of the legislature to set the
specific statutory lengths of time within which legal rights are
actionable. 74 The legislature rarely proffers a rationale to explain
to be diagnosed when a person has reached her late 20s to early 30s. See id. at
79. Upon a review of 38 case reports, Putnam found a mean age of 28 years.
See id. Putnam also cites: the research of Bliss and Allison who report average
ages at diagnosis of 30 and 29.4, respectively, see id. at 79-80; the findings of
Kluft, who reported a mean age of 36.1, see id.; and a survey of 100 independent
cases of MPD that isolates an average age of 31.3. See id.; see also Note,
Preserving the Victim's Remedy, supra note 2, at 202 n.90.
69. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (5th ed. 1979).
70. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 203(a) (McKinney 1972).
71. See WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 9, 201.02. The commentators
noted that:
[Cause of action] has been defined to mean a "right to sue to some
substantial end," at the center of which "is a grievance that is judicially
cognizable, in the sense that a court can provide some remedy for it."
The cause of action accrues, for purposes of measuring the period of
limitations, at the time the plaintiff is first able to commence the
particular action.
Id. 203.01.
72. See 2 H. WOOD, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS 684-85 (1916).
73. See id. at 839.
74. New York Civil Practice Law § 201 provides in pertinent part that "[n]o
court shall extend the time limited by law for the commencement of an action."
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 201 (McKinney 1972).
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the differences between statutory periods, and the prescribed sta-
tutory periods themselves are, to a certain extent, arbitrary."
Nevertheless, a number of policy considerations supporting stat-
utes of limitations help to explain the legislature's prescription of
differing periods of limitations and rules of accrual. Policy concerns
have been framed in broad terms embracing societal interests, 76 as
well as in more particular terms addressing the interests of individual
litigants." One of the most ingrained policies stems from the belief
that with the passage of time, the defendant's right to repose
supplants the plaintiff's right to a remedy. As phrased originally
by the Supreme Court in 1944, "the right to be free of stale claims
in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." 78 The
notion that a defendant should be protected from stale claims is
founded, however, on the assumption that a plaintiff who has
"slumbered ' 79 on a known right has been afforded a reasonable
time and opportunity in which to learn of the wrong and seek a
remedy.80
A second policy consideration, one that reflects a concern with
judicial efficiency and fairness, is the court's belief that the truth-
seeking process is better served by a bar on stale claims.8 Although
they rarely articulate this consideration, courts may presume that
a plaintiff who delays in seeking redress for his grievance has a
less meritorious claim than a plaintiff who seeks a remedy within
the statutorily prescribed period.8 2 Cited with greater frequency by
the courts, however, is the rationale that evidence becomes less
75. See WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 9, 201.01.
76. 1 H. WOOD, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS 9 (1916) (statutes of limitations
regarded as devices "essential to the security of all men" and which ensure
"peace and welfare in society"); Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limi-
tations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950) (observing disruptive effect that
unsettled claims have on commercial intercourse); Dawson, Estoppel and Statutes
of Limitation, 34 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1935) (maintaining that statutes of limitations
are necessary for sake of stability and permanence in social relationships) [here-
inafter Estoppel and Limitations].
77. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321
U.S. 342, 349 (1944) (claims were timely pursued even though plaintiff did not
show "reckless haste" in commencing suit).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id.; see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118 (1979) (cause
of action accrues when plaintiff knows both existence and cause of his injury,
not when he knows that legal duty is breached).
81. See WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 9, 201.01.
82. Id.
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available and reliable with the passage of time. 8 By barring claims
after a given period of time, it is believed, therefore, that statutes
of limitations increase the likelihood that courts will resolve factual
disputes more fairly and accurately.8 4
Finally, it has been suggested that the time-of-injury accrual rule
for personal injury causes of action reflects not so much a concern
with the defendant's right to repose as it does a desire for a rule
that addresses itself to the garden-variety tort claim, the harm of
which is readily apparent. 85 Thus, statutes of limitations exceptions,
primarily the time of discovery rule, address those atypical tort
situations in which the plaintiff is "blamelessly ignorant" of the.
injury.86 Underlying such exceptions as the discovery rule is a policy
concern with fairness and a willingness to balance the risk of stale
claims against the inequity of precluding justified causes of actions
in those situations where the plaintiff is constructively denied a
meaningful opportunity to seek a remedy. 87
C. Exceptions to a Strict Application of Limitations Periods
and Personal Injury Accrual Rules
Although New York has consistently maintained that a court
may not extend the statutory periods fixed by the legislature to
commence an action,88 it has also developed certain statutory pro-
visions that either toll the statute of limitations or alter the date
of accrual.8 9 Additionally, courts have developed common law doc-
83. Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 348-49; Kubrick, 444 U.S. at
117; Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 430, 248 N.E.2d 871,
872, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (1969); Conklin v. Furman, 48 N.Y. 527, 529 (1872).
84. See Epstein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. Cm. L. REV.
1175, 1182-83 (1986) [hereinafter Epstein].
85. See Note, Preserving the Victim's Remedy, supra note 2, at 207.
86. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949).
87. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1987).
88. While New York Civil Practice Rule 3018(b) requires the defendant to
plead the statute of limitations affirmatively, see N.Y. Civ. PRAC L. & R. 3018(b)
(McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1987), the defendant may also make a motion under
New York Civil Practice Rule 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the action based on the expira-
tion of the statute of limitations. See id. 3211 (a)(5) (McKinney 1970); see also WEIN-
STEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 9, 201.10.
89. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 208 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987); id.
§ 213(5) (McKinney 1972) (action by state for spoilation of public property); id.
§ 213(8) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987) (action based on fraud); id. § 214(7)
(McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987) (action to annul marriage based on fraud); id.
§ 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1987) (malpractice discovery exceptions for foreign
objects); id. § 214-b (McKinney Supp. 1987) (agent orange exception for Vietnam
veterans); id. § 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1987) (action for toxic tort injuries).
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trines that operate to estop the defendant from interposing a statute
of limitations defense.90 The exceptions have been extended to
situations in which: (1) the defendant induces the plaintiff to forego
timely suit because of the defendant's inequitable conduct; 9 (2)
the plaintiff is unable to commence timely suit because of conduct
on the defendant's part constituting duress or undue influence;
92
(3) the plaintiff suffers from an overall mental disability at the
time the cause of action accrues; 93 or (4) the plaintiff is unable to
discover the injury because of its inherently unknowable nature. 94
1. Equitable Estoppel
The legislature has provided the courts with the equitable au-
thority to estop the defendant from asserting the affirmative defense
that the statute of limitations has expired. 95 The doctrine of eq-
uitable estoppel thus allows the plaintiff to appeal to the court to
prevent the defendant from asserting a statute of limitations defense
when the defendant's own misconduct makes it inequitable for him
to interpose it;96
90. See Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 377 N.E.2d 713, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259
(1978) (construing doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent defendant from as-
serting defense of statute of limitations); General Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, 18
N.Y.2d 125, 219 N.E.2d 169, 272 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1966) (same); see also Baratta
v. Kozlowski, 94 A.D.2d 454, 458-60, 464 N.Y.S.2d 803, 806-807 (2d Dep't 1983)
(discussing potential availability of doctrines of duress and undue influence as
means of estopping defendant from asserting statute of limitations defense).
91. See Simcuski, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 377 N.E.2d 713, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1978);
General Stencils, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 125, 219 N.E.2d 169, 272 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1966).
92. See Baratta, 94 A.D.2d at 458-60, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 806-807.
93. See Barnes v. County of Onondaga, 103 A.D.2d 624, 628, 481 N.Y.S.2d
539, 544 (4th Dep't 1984), aff'd, 65 N.Y.2d 664, 481 N.E.2d 245, 491 N.Y.S.2d
613 (1985) (plaintiff required to show overall inability to function in society in
order to invoke mental disability tolling exception of New York Civil Procedure
Law § 208).
94. See N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. L. & R. § 213(5) (McKinney Supp. 1972); id.
§ 213(8) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987); id. § 214(7) (McKinney 1972 & Supp.
1987); id. § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1987); id. § 214-b (McKinney Supp. 1987);
id. § 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1987).
95. The common law doctrine of equitable estoppel has been codified in New
York General Obligations Law § 17-103(4)(b) (formerly New York Personal Prop-
erty Law § 34(4)(b)) and provides that a promise to waive, extend or not plead
the statute of limitations "does not affect the power of the court to find that
by reason of conduct of the party to be charged it is inequitable to permit him
to interpose the defense of the statute of limitations." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 17-103(4)(b) (McKinney 1978).
96. See id.
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Equitable estoppel cases tend to fall into two categories. 97 First,
when the effect of the defendant's conduct is to lull the plaintiff
into inactivity or otherwise obstruct the plaintiff in prosecuting a
known claim, 9 the court may estop the defendant from asserting
a statute of limitations defense. Second, the defendant may be
estopped when, by fraudulent acts or representations, he conceals
an unknown cause of action from the plaintiff. 99 Moreover, when
the defendant and plaintiff stand in a relationship of trust and
confidence so that a fiduciary duty is owing, and the defendant
fails to disclose facts that he has a duty to reveal, then such non-
disclosure itself is deemed to be fraudulent concealment sufficient
to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 00 An overarching
restriction on equitable estoppel's inherently flexible nature, 10 how-
ever, is the requirement that the plaintiff prove he has exercised
due diligence in discovering the wrong.10 2
97. See WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 9,* 201.13.
98. See id.; see also Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 337 N.E.2d 713, 406
N.Y.S.2d 259 (1978) (physician concealing condition of plaintiff's severed nerve
to avoid malpractice action); Valenti v. Trunfio, 118 A.D.2d 480, 449 N.Y.S.2d
955 (1st Dep't 1986), appeal dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 661, 503 N.E.2d 1376, 511
N.Y.S.2d 839 (1986) (record failed to disclose any misrepresentations made by
defendant hospital); Mclvor v. Di Benedetto, 121 A.D.2d 519, 503 N.Y.S.2d 836
(2d Dep't 1986) (plaintiff failed to allege specific misrepresentations made by
defendant physician); Rains v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 120 A.D.2d 509, 501
N.Y.S.2d 709 (2d Dep't 1986) (wilful intent to mislead plaintiff is required);
Jordon v. Ford Motor Co., 73 A.D.2d 422, 426 N.Y.S.2d 359 (4th Dep't 1980)
(manufacturer alleged to have concealed defective fuel tank); see, e.g., Glus v.
Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959) (plaintiff induced to delay
commencing suit due to defendant's representation that he had twelve years to
begin suit); Cerbone v. Int'l Ladies Garment Workers' Union, 768 F.2d 45, 49-
50 (2d Cir. 1985) (defendant's conduct must cause plaintiff to delay suit); Anisfeld
v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., 631 F. Supp. 1461, 1466-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (conduct
must be strong inducement to forego suit).
99. See WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 9, 1 201.13; see also General
Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, 18 N.Y.2d 125, 219 N.E.2d 169, 272 N.Y.S.2d 337
(1966); Erbe v. Lincoln Trust Co., 13 A.D.2d 211, 214 N.Y.S.2d 849 (4th Dep't
1961), appeal dismissed, 11 N.Y.2d 754, 181 N.E.2d 629, 226 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1962)
(breach of fiduciary duty by trustee to secretly buy securities from estate); cf.
Greenfield v. Kanwit, 87 F.R.D. 129, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (defendant who conceals
relevant facts to commencement of timely suit is estopped).
100. See WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 9, 201.13 n.103; see also
Rockwell v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 510 F. Supp. 266, 270 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
101. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 17-103(4)(b) (McKinney 1978).
102. See Simcuski, 44 N.Y. 2d at 450-51, 377 N.E.2d at 717, 406 N.Y.S.2d
at 263; General Stencils, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d at 128-29, 219 N.E.2d at 171, 272
N.Y.S.2d at 340; Schroeder v. Brooklyn Hosp., 119 A.D.2d 564, 500 N.Y.S.2d
733 (2d Dep't 1986); Roe v. Bonura, 132 Misc. 2d 390, 503 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup.
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The New York Court of Appeals in General Stencils, Inc. v.
Chiappa'03 exercised its equitable powers in holding that equitable
estoppel may be invoked "where it is the defendant's affirmative
wrongdoing ... which produce[s] the long delay between the accrual
of the cause of action and the institution of the legal proceed-
ings. 1 0 4 General Stencils involved a conversion claim against an
embezzling bookkeeper. 05 Based on the inherent secrecy in the very
nature of the defendant's actionable conduct, the court held that
a defendant standing in a fiduciary relationship to the plaintiff
may be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations
as a defense because of his own affirmative wrongdoing and in-
tentional concealment. 06 Furthermore, the General Stencils court
set out three elements that the plaintiff must prove in order for
equitable estoppel to apply on the grounds of fraudulent con-
cealment. The plaintiff must show: (1) that he was diligent in
enforcing his rights; (2) that a fiduciary relationship existed between
the plaintiff and the defendant; and (3) that misconduct occurred
in the relationship to the detriment of the plaintiff. 0 7 The primary
function of equitable estoppel is thus "the protection of expectations
aroused by misleading conduct." 08
Ct. Suffolk County 1986); see also Renz v. Beeman, 589 F.2d 735, 751-52 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 834 (1979) (timely knowledge exists where
plaintiff can discover relevant facts with reasonable diligence); Barrett v. Hoffman,
521 F. Supp. 307, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (plaintiff must demonstrate he was not
negligent in discovering wrong), rev'd, 689 F.2d 324 (1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1131 (1983); Rockwell, 510 F. Supp. at 271 (plaintiff must pursue claim
diligently); Augstein v. Levey, 3 A.D.2d 595, 162 N.Y.2d 269 (1957), aff'd, 4
N.Y.2d 791, 149 N.E.2d 528, 173 N.Y.S.2d 27 (doctrine of equitable estoppel
applicable when plaintiff has "timely knowledge" sufficient to impose duty of
inquiry and ascertainment of relevant facts).
103. 18 N.Y.2d 125, 219 N.E.2d 169, 272 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1966).
104. See id. at 128, 219 N.E.2d at 171, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
105. See id. at 126, 219 N.E.2d at 170, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
106. See id. at 127, 219 N.E.2d at 339, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 339 (court noting
that equitable estoppel neither suspends nor changes date on which cause of
action accrues; rather, it represents successful counter-defense by disallowing
defendant's initial defense that statute of limitations has lapsed).
107. See id. at 128-29, 219 N.E.2d at 171, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
108. Estoppel and Limitations, supra note 76, at 1. Dawson also notes that
equitable estoppel usually requires "misleading conduct which relates to existing
facts." Id. at 3.
Commentators have noted that the lines between equitable estoppel and fraud
and fraudulent concealment often blur when the equitable estoppel is based on
the fraudulent acts or misrepresentation of the defendant. See Comment, Estoppel
and the New York Statute of Limitations, 26 ALB. L. REV. 38, 44 (1962); see
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The doctrine of equitable estoppel was recently asserted in Smith
v. Smith, 0 9 a New York federal civil suit brought by an adult
plaintiff suing for damages attributable to childhood incest abuse.
In Smith, the acts of sexual abuse began shortly after plaintiff's
birth and continued until she was twelve years old. °10 The plaintiff,
who brought the action at age thirty-two (twenty years after the
last incident of abuse and ten years after the statutory period of
limitations expired), alleged that the defendant fraudulently con-
cealed from plaintiff the fact that she had a cause of action by
indoctrinating her with misrepresentations and deceits throughout
her childhood."' These alleged misrepresentations included: (1)
that the sexual activities defendant performed on plaintiff were
normal and not damaging; (2) that the plaintiff must not tell anyone
about the defendant's sexual assaults because she would not be
believed and would be punished; (3) that she must not disclose the
sexual assaults or her family would be destroyed and she would
die; and finally (4) that it was her own fault that her father was
having sexual relations with her because she was a bad and seductive
child."12
The court in Smith, however, found the doctrine of equitable
estoppel wholly inapplicable to the plaintiff's claim. Specifically,
the court rejected the plaintiff's contentions that the defendant had
fraudulently concealed a cause of action unknown to the plaintiff
or, in the alternative, that the defendant engaged in conduct or
made statements that induced the plaintiff to forego suit on a
known cause of action." 3 The plaintiff in Smith had argued that
under either of the above theories in which equitable estoppel has
also Estoppel and Limitations, supra note 76. Dawson describes those situations
in which equitable estoppel merges with fraud and fraudulent concealment as the
"outer boundaries" of the types of misleading conduct sufficient to invoke the
estoppel exception. Estoppel and Limitations, supra note 76, at 4. When this is
the case, an analytical distinction between equitable estoppel based on whether
the claim is known or unknown to the plaintiff has been deemed "artificial."
Id. at 24.
109. No. 85 Civ. 285E, slip op. at 1 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1986).
110. See id. at 1.
111. Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement
and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Strike at 5, Smith v. Smith, No. 85
Civ. 285E (W.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 28, 1986) (hereinafter Smith Affidavit].
112. See id.
113. Smith v. Smith, No. 85 Civ. 285E, slip op. at 3-4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 7,
1986). After this issue went to print, the Second Circuit affirmed this opinion on
essentially the same grounds. Smith v. Smith, No. 86-7993 (2d Cir. September 30,
1987).
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been held to apply, the defendant had interfered with the prose-
cution of her cause of action. 114
First, with respect to the defendant's having fraudulently con-
cealed a cause of action unknown to the plaintiff, the plaintiff
alleged that while she knew she had had sexual contact with her
father when she was a child, she could not know that this contact
constituted sexual abuse and that it could cause permanent dam-
age.115 Moreover, her father's direct misrepresentations, devised to
conceal the existence of the wrong" 6 and the identity of the
wrongdoer" 7 compounded the plaintiff's inability to perceive the
wrong. Thus the plaintiff, while aware of the conduct, was unaware
that she had been wronged until after the statutory period had
expired.'
The court, however, characterized the plaintiff's complaint as
having alleged an unawareness that legal redress was available,
which is generally regarded as insufficient to toll the statute of
limitations. 1 9 Interpreted as such, the plaintiff would unquestion-
ably have failed to assert proper grounds for the application of
equitable estoppel.120 The plaintiff also alleged, however, that the
defendant's sexual abuse coupled with the fraudulent concealment
of the harmfulness of the abuse and the identity of the wrongdoer
constituted a breach of the fiduciary relationship that exists between
parent and child.' 2' Thus, the plaintiff claimed that on the basis
114. See id. at 4.
115. See Smith Affidavit, supra note 111, at 5.
116. See id. (alleging defendant's fraudulent representation that "the sexual
activities he performed on [plaintiff] were normal and not damaging").
117. See id. (alleging defendant fraudulently represented that "it was [plaintiff's]
own fault that her father was having the sexual relationship with her because
she was a bad and seductive child").
One commentator has noted that there is "abundant authority for the prop-
osition that direct misrepresentations or other active steps to conceal the identity
of the wrongdoer do justify delay and suspend the statute." See Dawson, Fraud-
ulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitations, 31 MICH. L. REV. 875, 914 n.110
(1933) (citing Dodds v. McColgan, 229 A.D. 273, 241 N.Y.S. 584 (lst Dep't
1930) (suspension of statute granted when testatrix's fraudulent acts and misre-
presentations were designed to conceal her liability for payment)).
118. Smith v. Smith, No. 85 Civ. 285E, slip op. at 1 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1986).
119. See 2 H. WOOD, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONs 839 (1916) ("ignorance of facts
makes no exception to the rule that statute commences to run from the date of
the tort").
120. Smith v. Smith, No. 85 Civ. 285E, slip op. at 3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 7,
1986).
121. Smith Affidavit, supra note 111, at 5.
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of the defendant's wrongful conduct and continuing misrepresen-
tations, the defendant concealed the plaintiff's cause of action until
after the statutory period had lapsed. 22
The court, however, stated that "the defendant ... cannot be
said to have fraudulently concealed or misrepresented ... the wrong
[from the plaintiff] . . . once she had achieved majority status.
The plaintiff, upon reaching majority, understood that wrongs had
been committed." 123 This latter observation reveals an unwillingness
of the court to go beyond the most constricted interpretation of
the elements of equitable estoppel.
The court found the plaintiff's alternative argument, that the
defendant caused her to forego timely suit on a known cause of
action, equally unpersuasive. 124 The court apparently rejected the
argument that because plaintiff suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder she was truly incapable of pursuing her legal remedy.125
More specifically, the court did not accept the plaintiff's argument
that the defendant indirectly caused her to forego timely suit by
having directly caused her to suffer from a psychological disorder
which prevented her from being able to confront the alleged wrong
within the statutory time period. 126 Separating the defendant's con-
duct from its effect on the plaintiff, the court reasoned that "the
defendant did not actively conceal these wrongs through fraud,
deception or misrepresentation once the plaintiff had achieved her
majority.'1 7 In sum, the court in Smith concluded that the defend-
ant had not breached a fiduciary duty to plaintiff and thus had
no obligation to inform the plaintiff of her cause of action. 28 The
122. Smith v. Smith, No. 85 Civ. 285E, slip op. at 4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 7; 1986)
123. See id. (emphasis added).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 3. Presumably this conclusion follows because the court found
no fraudulent concealment. The court, however, supported its conclusion by citing
Goldin v. Scalise, 87 A.D.2d 959, 451 N.Y.S.2d 215 (3d Dep't 1982), which
presented a situation in which no relationship of trust or confidence existed
between the parties so that a fiduciary duty was owing. See Goldin, 87 A.D.2d
at 959, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 215. The court in Smith failed to consider that a fiduciary
relationship, here between parent and child, may constitute an exception to
the usual rule that "there is no duty upon a potential defendant to inform an
adversary of the existence of a cause of action." Goldin, 87 A.D. 2d at 959,
451 N.Y.S.2d at 216; see also WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 9,
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court held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not apply
because it found that the defendant's misrepresentations ceased
before the statute of limitations period had expired and that by
the time the plaintiff reached majority she was aware of at least
some of the acts of incest.'2 9 The court therefore concluded that
a strict statute of limitations had to be applied and the defendant's
statute of limitations defense was upheld. 30
The reasoning in Smith seems to have been based primarily on
the dictum of the court of appeals in Simcuski v. Saeli.'3' In
Simcuski the court observed:
[I]f the conduct relied on (fraud, misrepresentation or other
deception) has ceased to be operational . . . within a reasonable
time prior to the expiration of such period, many courts have
denied application of the doctrine [of equitable estoppel] on the
ground that the period during which the plaintiff was justifiably
lulled into inactivity had expired prior to the termination of the
statutory period, and that the plaintiff thereafter had sufficient
time to commence his action prior to the expiration of the period
of limitations. 132
Stated another way, when a court determines that a defendant's
tactics of obstruction cease within a reasonable time prior to the
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, then it is un-
201.13. The commentators note that:
It has been said that a finding of fraudulent concealment requires some
affirmative act of misrepresentation by the defendant. But, where there
is a fiduciary relationship between the parties, the fiduciary will be
held to a higher standard, and if he intentionally fails to disclose facts
which he has a duty to reveal, he will be guilty of fraudulent con-
cealment.
WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 9, 201.13.
129. Smith v. Smith, No. 85 Civ. 285E, slip op. at 3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1986).
130. See id.
131. 44 N.Y.2d 442, 377 N.E.2d 713, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1978).
132. Id. at 449-50, 377 N.E.2d at 717, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
The court observed, however, that for purposes of pleading, the plaintiff may
have two separate causes of action available when the defendant's fraudulent
acts or representations have caused the plaintiff to forego timely suit. See id.
at 448, 377 N.E.2d at 715-16, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 262. Thus the plaintiff may sue
on both the original time-barred cause of action (such as assault or malpractice)
which is the target of the estoppel; and a separate cause of action for intentional
fraud. See id. In sum, when a defendant resorts to tactics of obstruction that
amount to fraud, the plaintiff may plead both causes of action as "supplementary
devices" to each other. Estoppel and Limitations, supra note 76, at 24.
[Vol. XV
19871 INCEST CLAIM ACCRUAL
reasonable to attribute the plaintiff's inactivity in commencing suit
to the defendant's conduct.
2. Duress and Undue Influence
The common law doctrines of duress and undue influence 133 in
the appropriate situation also may provide the plaintiff with a
method of precluding a defendant's statute of limitations defense.
Although a factually sufficient claim of duress or undue influence
does not prevent the accrual of the cause of action, it does suspend
the statute of limitations period until the duress ceases. 3 4 It is thus
a question of fact as to precisely when the circumstances constituting
the duress or undue influence terminate or when the plaintiff should
reasonably know that the duress has ceased.135 Similarly, New York
adopts both an objective and subjective test of discovery, which
takes into account a particular plaintiff's unique circumstances and
perceptions.3 6 The doctrine as formulated recognizes that "the
pressure applied does not have to be such as to overcome the will
of a brave or courageous [person], or even that of a [person] of
ordinary firmness, but is sufficient if it in fact overcomes the will
of the person against whom it is applied."'137
133. Black's Law Dictionary provides that:
Duress consists in any . .. threats of bodily or other harm, or other
means amounting to or tending to coerce the will of another, and
actually inducing him to do the act contrary to his free will .... [Duress
is] [d]istinguishable from undue influence, because in the latter, the
wrongdoer is generally in a fiduciary capacity or in a position of trust
and confidence with respect to the victim of the undue influence.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 452 (5th ed. 1979).
134. See Baratta v. Kozlowski, 94 A.D.2d 454, 458-59, 464 N.Y.S.2d 803, 806
(2d Dep't 1983) (defendant's death threats when plaintiff filed suit); Pacchiana
v. Pacchiana, 94 A.D.2d 721, 462 N.Y.S.2d 256 (2d Dep't 1983) (continuing
duress may toll statute of limitations although not applicable to antenuptial
agreement); Kamenitsky v. Corcoran, 97 Misc. 384, 161 N.Y.S. 756, rev'd on
other grounds, 177 A.D. 605, 164 N.Y.S. 297 (1917) (duress may be exercised
by threats to take away plaintiff's news stand license and is not dependent upon
actual power to carry out such threats).
135. See Piper v. Hoard, 107 N.Y. 67, 71 (1887); see also Annotation, Duress
or Undue Influence as Tolling or Suspending Statutes of Limitations, 121 A.L.R.
1294, 1295 (1939). See generally 49 N.Y. JUR. 2D 62 (1985).
136. See Sylvan Mortgage* Co. v. Stadler, 113 Misc. 659, 663, 185 N.Y.S. 293,
297 (1920), rev'd on other grounds, 115 Misc. 311, 118 N.Y.S. 165, aff'd, 199
A.D. 965, 191 N.Y.S. 955 (1921) (in contract situation "the condition of mind
produced by threats which render a person incapable of exercising his free will
... should be the only inquiry").
137. 49 N.Y. JUR. 2D 62, 63 (1985).
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The New York courts have imposed a curious limitation, however,
on the plaintiff's use of the doctrine of duress as a counter-measure
to a defendant's assertion of a statute of limitations defense. The
courts require that when the underlying cause of action is not based
on and is unrelated to the duress, duress will not suspend the
running of the statute of limitations period.'38 Conversely, when
the plaintiff proves that the duress or undue influence is part of
the underlying cause of action, duress will estop the defendant
from asserting a statute of limitations defense.' 39
The defenses of duress and undue influence are of particular
potential use to the adult victim of childhood incest abuse, for the
court will, in considering any claim of duress, evaluate the unique
circumstances of the particular plaintiff in light of her perceived
threats.' 40 Specifically, the incest plaintiff's complaint will usually
contain an allegation that the defendant compelled her to have
unwanted sexual contact.' 4' It is unquestionable that the defendant
had no right to commit the acts and that the plaintiff had a right
to be free from them. 42 As formulated in New York, duress consists
of conduct that coerces the will or induces the performance of an
act that would otherwise not be performed. 13 Similarly, New York
law provides that the plaintiff's fear alone will not constitute duress
when there are insufficient allegations of defendant's misconduct
directed towards the plaintiff. '44 New York recognizes, however,
that threats alone may constitute duress.' 45 The allegations of a
complaint for incest abuse, which set forth the defendant's actions
and threats 146 as well as facts pertaining to the plaintiff such as
138. See Baratta, 94 A.D.2d at 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 806-807 (following Piper
v. Hoard, 107 N.Y. 67 (1887)).
139. See id.
140. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
141. See Complaint at 2, Smith v. Smith, No. 85 Civ. 285E (W.D.N.Y. filed
Feb. 22, 1985).
142. See Gerstein v. 532 Broad Hollow Road Co., 75 A.D.2d 292, 429 N.Y.S.2d
195 (1st Dep't 1980); see also Kazaras v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 4 A.D.2d
227, 164 N.Y.S.2d 211 (1st Dep't 1957), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 930, 151 N.E.2d 356,
175 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1958).
143. See Gerstein, 75 A.D.2d at 297, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 199; see also Kazaras, 4
A.D.2d at 237, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
144. See In re White's Estate, 182 Misc. 223, 46 N.Y.S.2d 917, aff'd, 268
A.D. 759, 49 N.Y.S.2d 275, appeal dismissed, 293 N.Y. 767, 57 N.E.2d 845
(1943).
145. Kamenitsky v. Corcoran, 97 Misc. 384, 161 N.Y.S. 756, rev'd on other
grounds, 177 A.D. 605, 164 N.Y.S. 297 (1917).
146. See Complaint at 2-3, Smith v. Smith, No. 85 Civ. 285E (W.D.N.Y. filed
Feb. 22, 1985).
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her infancy 147 during the period of abuse and her involuntary
capitulation, 48 are arguably sufficient to constitute circumstances
of duress suffered by the plaintiff.149
Thus, under the New York rule as explained in Baratta v.
Kozlowski,'"° the adult victim of childhood incest abuse can po-
tentially make out the grounds for estopping the defendant's statute
of limitations defense based on the assertion that the duress was
not collateral, but rather was part of the underlying claim.' 5 ' The
incest victim is thus presenting a situation wholly distinguishable
from Baratta, in which the underlying claim of conversion was
free from any duress or undue influence-the circumstances evi-
dencing duress occurring years later, in response to threat of suit. 52
3. Mental Disability
Section 208 of the New York Civil Procedure Law and Rules15
suspends the running of the statute of limitations when the plaintiff
is under a mental disability at the time the cause of action accrues. 5 4
The courts have shown a willingness to apply section 208 to mental
disabilities that have arisen as a result of the defendant's wrongful
conduct as well as to those mental disabilities that predate a given
cause of action.,' Nevertheless, the courts have shown a general
reluctance to apply the insanity tolling exception to what they
consider to be "temporary mental afflictions' ' 5 6 and have chosen
to define the term "insanity" narrowly. 5 7
147. See id. at 2.
148. See id.
149. See id. Plaintiff's complaint would arguably satisfy the requirements of
New York Civil Practice Rule 3016(b) which provides that "[where a cause of
action or defense is based upon misrepresentation, fraud, mistake, wilful default,
breach of trust or undue influence, the circumstances constituting the wrong shall
be stated in detail." N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 3016(b) (McKinney 1974).
150. 94 A.D.2d 454, 464 N.Y.S.2d 803 (2d Dep't 1983).
151. See id. at 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
152. See id.
153. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 208 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987); see
also WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 9, 1 208.01.
154. See supra note 153.
155. See McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 543, 435 N.E.2d
1072, 450 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1980) (court considering whether New York Civil Practice
Law § 208 is applicable to plaintiff's post-traumatic neurosis which he developed
after defendant's negligent conduct caused plaintiff's car to explode).
156. Id. at 547, 549 n.3, 435 N.E.2d at 1074, 1075 n.3, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 459,
460 n.3 (the court also overruled Prude v. County of Erie, 47 A.D.2d 111, 364
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In the absence of statutory definition,'58 insanity is defined by
the courts as an overall inability to function in society and an
incapacity to pursue one's legal rights. 5 9 Similarly, the New York
Court of Appeals has explicity rejected any claim of "post-traumatic
neurosis" as constituting insanity for purposes of section 208.160
Presumably, the plaintiff in Smith, suffering from Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, 6' would also have been unsuccessful in countering
the defendant's affirmative defense of the statute of limitations
with a claim of mental disability. 62
The adult incest victim who suffers from multiple personality
disorder 6 13 is possibily in a factually different situation under section
208. While both PTSD and MPD are elaborate coping devices,
they are radically different in the effect that they each have on
the plaintiff's "overall ability" to function in society. The victim
suffering from PTSD is almost always a fused and integrated
individual who, although in tremendous psychic pain, nevertheless
is able to lead an otherwise productive life. 64 The MPD victim
may present a much different situation. One personality may be
quite capable of functioning, while the alternates may in turn be
suicidal, homicidal, amnesic-in sum, unable to function, discover,
comprehend or seek redress for the injury. 65 Accordingly, the
N.Y.S.2d 643 (4th Dep't 1975) (holding that post-traumatic neurosis could con-
stitute "insanity" for purposes of New York Civil Practice Law § 208) and Hurd
v. County of Allegany, 39 A.D.2d 499, 336 N.Y.S.2d 952 (4th Dep't 1972)
(same)).
157. See id. at 548-49, 435 N.E.2d at 1074-75, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 459-60.
158. See id. at 547, 435 N.E.2d at 1074, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 548-49, 435 N.E.2d at 1075, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
161. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
162. But see Barnes v. County of Onondaga, 103 A.D.2d 624, 481 N.Y.S.2d
539 (4th Dep't 1984), aff'd, 65 N.Y.2d 664, 481 N.E.2d 245, 491 N.Y.S.2d 613
(1985) (plaintiff's depressive reaction held to be more serious than neurosis, since
the plaintiff was able to show that her overall ability to function in society was
severly limited); Wheeler v. State of New York, 104 A.D.2d 496, 498, 479
N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (2d Dep't 1984) (plaintiff's evidence of manic-depressive illness
may be sufficient under New York Civil Practice Law § 208 to toll statute of
limitations).
163. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
164. See generally Donaldson & Gardner, supra note 55.
165. See Graboi v. Kibel, 432 F. Supp. 572, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (court espoused
standard of pragmatism in determining whether person is mentally disabled for
purposes of New York Civil Practice Law § 208, and stressed consideration of
"all the relevant facts and circumstances" which may result in incapacity to
"pursue [one's] lawful rights" or "manage one's affairs").
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mental disability tolling exception of section 208 may be more
readily applicable to the multiple personality victim. In addition,
MPD would constitute a mental disability that as a factual matter
may be found to have existed continuously, and that merely takes
decades to diagnose. 166 The fact that the diagnosis for MPD is
made after the plaintiff reaches majority should not affect the
ability to use the mental disabilty tolling provision under section
208. Because MPD is treatable and responsive to psychotherapy,
an incest victim suffering from the disorder, once achieving a stable
fusion of the personality, could commence suit at this time and
terminate the period of disability for purposes of section 208.167
Nevertheless, under New York law, the mental disabilty tolling
exception for the statute of limitations is probably the least desirable
for most incest plaintiffs. This undesirability is not due to a possible
stigmatization of the plaintiff as "insane." Rather, section 208
loses its attractiveness in light of both the narrow meaning the
courts have given to the term "insanity" up to the present,1 68 and
the ten year outside limit on the statutory tolling provision for
mental disability. 169
4. New York's Discovery Rule and the Incest Plaintiff
New York, until quite recently, was one of the few jurisdictions
that, except in limited circumstances, 70 generally failed to recognize
a discovery rule for determining when a cause of action accrues.
The New York Legislature has recently amended the Civil Practice
Law and Rules, however, to provide for a statute of limitations
discovery rule for past and future toxic tort victims suing for damages
caused by the latent effects of exposure to certain substances and
materials. 7' The amendment provides in pertinent part:
166. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
167. New York Civil Practice Law § 208 provides, however, that the mental
disability toll cannot result in an extension of more than ten years from the
accrual of the claim. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 208 (McKinney 1972 &
Supp. 1987).
168. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
169. See id.
170. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 213(5) (McKinney 1972); id. § 213(8)
(McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987); id. § 214(7) (McKinney 1972 and Supp. 1987);
id. § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1987); id. § 214-b (McKinney Supp. 1987); id.
§ 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1987).
171. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1987).
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[An action to recover damages for personal injury ... caused
by the latent effects of exposure to any substance [must be
commenced within three years] and shall be computed from the
date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or the date when
through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should
have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier. 72
New York's toxic tort discovery rule is also significant in that it
permits plaintiffs to commence actions, not only upon discovery
of the injury, but also upon discovery of the cause of the injury. 73
It is plaintiff's burden, however, to prove that "technical, scientific
or medical knowledge .. .sufficient to ascertain the cause of [the]
injury had not been discovered . .. prior to the expiration of the
period within which the action ...would have been authorized."'' 74
Thus New York, with one broad enactment, has moved from among
the ranks of the least active jurisdictions in the area of developing
the time-of-discovery rule to among the most liberal and farsighted
of jurisdictions.
III. The Current Inadequacies of Applying Common Law and
Statutory Tolling Exceptions to Incest-Based Tort Claims and a
Proposed Solution
Under current interpretations of the common law doctrines of
equitable estoppel175 and duress,' 7 6 as well as under the statutory
172. Id.
173. New York Civil Practice Law § 214-c(4) provides in pertinent part:
[Wihere the discovery of the cause of the injury is alleged to have
occurred less than five years after discovery of the injury or when with
reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered, whichever
is earlier, an action may be commenced . .. within one year of such
discovery of the cause of the injury.
Id. § 214-c(4) (McKinney Supp. 1987); see also Rheingold, The New Statute of
Limitations in Tort Actions in New York, N.Y.L.J., July 29, 1986, at 1-3, col.
4 (explaining that "[i]f within five years after discovery of the injury there is
discovery of the cause of the injury, then the person has one year within which
to sue from the date of discovery of the cause of the injury") [hereinafter
Rheingold].
174. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-c(4) (McKinney Supp. 1987); see also
Rheingold, supra note 173, at 3, col. 1. Rheingold inquires whether the burden
is on the plaintiff to prove that "within the period otherwise allowed to bring
suit (namely, three years from date of discovery of the injury), he could not
have known the cause of his condition? Or does it mean that [he] must prove
that no one . . including the defendant knew that the substance could cause
the condition?" Rheingold, supra note 173, at 3, col. 1. Rheingold concludes
that the latter proposition would be an absurd result. See Rheingold, supra note
173, at 3, col. 1.
175. See supra notes 95-132 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 133-52 and accompanying text.
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tolling exception for mental disability,' adult incest victims have
thus far been unsucccessful in litigating their civil claims. Were
these exceptions construed more broadly and balanced more fairly
against the traditional policy concerns that underlie statutes of
limitations,178 the incest victim might have an existing solution to
her considerable procedural obstacle.
One can readily see for instance, that the articulated objective
of time-barring claims because evidence decays with the passage
of time is not served by a bar on the adult civil incest suit.
Commentators have observed that not all evidence is made stale
simply by the passage of time. 179 Moreover, as recently pointed
out by the dissent in Tyson v. Tyson, 80 the average case of incest
abuse occurs when the child is eleven or twelve years old. 8' Thus,
under the applicable statutes of limitations, the plaintiff currently
has until the age of nineteen or twenty-one to file suit.'82 The
dissent corrrectly points out, however, that because the plaintiff
can take advantage of this infancy tolling exception, the evidence
will already be between eight to ten years old by the time the
plaintiff commences suit.'83 By extension, when the plaintiff is
unable to commence suit within the applicable statute of limitations
period, the evidence she relies on is "not logically so much less
'verifiable' that it warrants . foreclosing a potentially meritorious
claim.'''8 4
Turning to the Smith court's failure to apply the doctrine of
equitable estoppel to an incest-based tort claim,' 5 one is struck
with the almost offhand application of the case law of equitable
estoppel to the facts of the incest victim's claim. Quite clearly,
fraudulent representations of the incest offender, made to the victim
throughout her childhood in order to force continued sexual com-
pliance, should furnish sufficient grounds to invoke the doctrine
177. See supra notes 153-67 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
179. See Epstein, supra note 84, at 1183.
180. See 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986) (Pearson, J., dissenting).
181. But see supra note 38 and accompanying text extract, suggesting that the
average case of incest abuse commences earlier than age eleven or twelve. Herman's
statistic, however, would only bolster the dissent's argument.
182. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
183. See Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 85, 727 P.2d at 232.
184. Id. at 86, 727 P.2d at 232.
185. Smith v. Smith, No. 85 Civ. 285E, slip op. at 3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1986).
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of equitable estoppel, even if the misrepresentations ended before
the statute of limitations expired.
The defendant's conduct, in perpetrating the sexual abuse
throughout the plaintiff's childhood 8 6 and in consistently misrep-
resenting the nature and consequences of the abuse as well as the
identity of the wrongdoer,8 7 created a situation in which the plaintiff
was obstructed in the prosecution of her claim, whether it was
known or unknown. Although the plaintiff in Smith was aware
that she had sexual contact with her father, she was unaware that
it constituted sexual abuse and could cause permanent damage.' 8
The plaintiff, in addition to being under the domination of the
parent and dependent upon him for survival, was arguably too
young to distinguish truth from falsity. 8 9 The defendant, thus took
advantage of the plaintiff's ignorance and miseducated her as to
the wrongfulness of the incest by a process of indoctrination.
The misrepresentations of the father committing incest thus serve
a two-fold purpose, one immediate, the other long-range. The im-
mediate goal of such misrepresentations is to gain ongoing sexual
access to the daughter in secrecy.' 90 The second purpose, no less
intended by the defefidant, and which may be more accurately
characterized as a causal result of such misrepresentations, is to
scar the daughter psychologically in such a way as to render her
unable to blame the defendant fully, much less be able to recognize
a legal wrong in his conduct.' 9'
For purposes of determining whether equitable estoppel applies
to incest-based tort claims, the adult plaintiff's "present under-
standing" of the wrongs should be considered in light of the
long-lasting effects of the defendant's wrongdoing and continuing
deceits, which are calculated only to conceal his culpability from
the plaintiff. The shame and guilt the defendant often succeeds in
inflicting on the plaintiff, 92 making it difficult for her to recognize
186. See Smith Affidavit, supra note 111, at 1.
187. See id. at 5; see also BAXTER, supra note 36, at 33.
188. See Smith Affidavit, supra note 111, at 4-5; see also McCabe, supra note
2, at 19.
189. See Smith Affidavit, supra note 111, at 1; see also BAXTER, supra note
36, at 12.
190. See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also BAXTER, supra note
36, at 33; McCabe, supra note 2, at 18-19.
191. See CLEVELAND, supra note 37, at 98.
192. See id. at 106; SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 152; Arthur, supra note 2,
at 2; McCabe, supra note 2, at 19.
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the wrong or wrongdoer, should be evaluated as factually sufficient
grounds to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel on the basis
of fraudulent concealment.
The notion that a plaintiff is automatically free to perceive and
then press a claim upon discovery that the defendant has fraud-
ulently represented the existence of the harm or concealed the cause
of action, may assume too much in the case of the adult survivor
of childhood incest abuse. The defendant's misrepresentations, while
known intellectually to be false by the plaintiff, may emotionally
scar and confuse the plaintiff so as to render her paralyzed rather
than lulled into inactivity after she has reached majority. 93 While
as an adult, the plaintiff may recognize that she did nothing wrong,
that she did not invite the offender's conduct and that the defendant
deceived her into believing these assertions, she may on a deeper
level believe the representations to be true, well into adulthood,
long after the applicable statutes of limitations have expired.194 The
quality of the relationship between parent and child, with trust
placed by the child in the parent, and the complete reliance which
such a relationship engenders in the child, 195 is a factor that the
court should not ignore in determining whether equitable estoppel
bars a defendant's statute of limitations defense.
The court in Smith, however, substantially vitiates the doctrine
of equitable estoppel in two ways. First the court finds the doctrine
inapplicable to situations in which the plaintiff has a substantial
inability to perceive the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.
Moreover, the court fails to invoke the doctrine even when the
plaintiff's incapacity is directly attributable to the defendant's abuse
of the fiduciary relationship between parent and child in order to
conceal the wrong. 96
Such a mechanistic application of the elements of equitable es-
toppel imposes an unrealistic and unfair burden upon the adult
193. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 152; McCabe, supra note 2, at 19.
194. See CLEVELAND, supra note 37, at 106.
195. See Simcuski, 44 N.Y.2d at 449, 377 N.E.2d at 716, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 263
(discussing doctor-patient relationship).
196. See Renda v. Frazer, 75 A.D.2d 490, 429 N.Y.S.2d 944 (4th Dep't 1980)
(malpractice action by patient suffering facial paralysis held to present question
of fact as to whether physician intentionally deceived patient by his prognosis).
The court noted that in order to raise an estoppel to bar a statute of limitations
defense, "it is not necessary for the trier of fact to find that [the defendant]
specifically intended to delay [the plaintiff's] institution of [the] malpractice action,
only that he intentionally misrepresented the fact or consequences of the mal-
practice." Id. at 495 n.3, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 947 n.3 (citation omitted).
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victim of childhood incest abuse. Arguably, the Smith court should
have considered the traumatic nature of the wrong involved and
the long-term harm it causes to the victim's psyche 97 to determine
if the conduct on which plaintiff relied ceased to be operational
after or before the expiration of the statute of limitations period.
Under the approach endorsed in Simcuski v. Saeli, 98 the inquiry
would then become whether the plaintiff has acted with due diligence
in bringing her claim after the facts giving rise to the estoppel ceased
to be operational. 199 Similarly, once the court allows the plaintiff
to prove the elements of equitable estoppel, the court can consider
whether the incest victim's burden of showing due diligence in
bringing her cause of action is satisfied by such actions as having
sought a course of psychological treatment, which often precipitates
the discovery of repressed incest abuse. 200
In the absence of the court's willingness to extend the common
law counter-measures and tolling exceptions of statutes of limita-
tions to incest-based tort claims, the adult victim of childhood
incest should have the benefit of the discovery rule. The reasons
to avoid burdening the victims of incest-based torts with a strict
time of injury accrual date are analogous to the justifications for
the toxic tort discovery rule. 20 1 The injuries in both situations are
slow-starting, and the incest victim may not know at the time the
applicable statute of limitations expires that she has suffered any
harm.20 2 As with the rationale for the toxic tort victim, the incest
plaintiff, who could not have known of her cause of action, cannot
be accused of "slumbering" on her rights. 203
One difficulty, however, prevents a complete analogy between
the toxic tort victim and the adult victim of childhood incest abuse.
This difficulty arises from the requirement that the nature of the
injury be "inherently unknowable," 20 4 during the statutory limi-
tations period and beyond, until the date of its discovery. In cases
197. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 186-87; see also supra notes 42-68 and
accompanying text.
198. 44 N.Y.2d 442, 377 N.E.2d 713, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1978).
199. See id. at 450, 377 N.E.2d at 717, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 263; see also supra
note 102 and accompanying text.
200. See Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986).
201. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1987).
202. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
203. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S.
342, 349 (1944).
204. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949).
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of incest abuse, the victim employs coping defenses, the most
common of which is repression and in some cases includes frag-
mentation of the personality. An elusive distinctioh in the degree
of inherent unknowability may emerge when one compares the lack
of knowledge of an incest victim who has repressed the memory
of the abuse with that of a person who inhales silica dust but fails
to manifest symptoms of silicosis until fifteen years later. Ar-
guably, the legislature would have to make a conceptual leap in
equating repression of knowledge with inherent lack of knowledge
if incest victims suing in adulthood are to avail themselves of the
discovery rule. The legislature should, however, recognize both the
powerful role that repression plays in the life of the incest victim,2 °5
as well as the psychotherapist's potential role in aiding the trier
of fact in its determination of when repression has ceased for time-
of-discovery purposes.20 6
IV. Legislative Proposal
The courts in New York are statutorily barred from extending
statutes of limitations. 20 7 Furthermore, the court of appeals has
consistently deferred to the legislature by holding that any modi-
fication in the time of injury accrual should be statu-
tory.20 8 Therefore, it is incumbent upon the legislature to enact a
205. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
206. See Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 86, 727 P.2d. at 233 (Pearson, J.,
dissenting); see also In re Nicole V., 123 A.D.2d 97, 510 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1st Dep't
1987) (reprinted in the N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14, 1987, at 1, col. 6) (child sexual abuse
proceeding).
In Nicole V., the court held a flexible corroboration requirement to be an
appropriate standard to determine whether sexual abuse occurred. See id. at 104,
510 N.Y.S.2d at 572. Furthermore, the court found that when there is "a lack
of medical evidence or inconclusive medical reports, no eyewitnesses, no admission
from the accused parent and a reluctance on the part of the victim, due to age
and post traumatic stress . .. an expert['s] validation interview is critical. ...
[The] expert confirms or fails to confirm the existence of ... post traumatic
stress . . . [and the] expert testimony [in the instant case] was found to be of
help to the trier of fact in assessing the reliability of complainant's allegations."
Id. at 106-107 (emphasis added); see also In re Ryan D., slip op. at 12-15 (4th
Dep't 1987) (no docket number in original) (LEXIS, States library, N.Y. file)
(child sexual abuse proceeding citing with approval Nicole V. and role of expert
testimony in explaining reticence of child sexual abuse victims to disclose abuse).
207. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 201 (McKinney 1972).
208. See Martin v. Edwards Labs, 60 N.Y.2d 417, 457 N.E.2d 1150, 469
N.Y.S.2d 923 (1983) (statute of limitations for personal injury caused by defective
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rule applicable to the adult victims of childhood incest abuse that
embraces the unique circumstances attendant to its civil redress.
The following is a suggested proposed amendment to the Civil
Procedure Law and Rules:
Section 214-d. Certain actions to be commenced within two years
of discovery. 209
A cause of action for personal injury under section 214.5 or
under section 215, based on incest abuse, 210 is deemed to have
accrued on the date when the plaintiff discovers, or when a
plaintiff in circumstances substantially similar to the plaintiff2t'
should have reasonably discovered, the injury caused by such
incest abuse, and shall be commenced within two years of which-
ever date is later. 212
implanted or inserted device runs from date of malfunction); Steinhardt v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1981)
(cause of action for inhalation of asbestos runs from date of last exposure);
Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d
920 (1979) (cause of action for injection of carcinogenic substance runs from
date of last exposure); Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d
212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963) (same); Schmidt v. Merchants
Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936) (negligence cause of
action for inhalation of dust accrues upon inhalation).
209. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 203(f) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987)
(providing outside maximum of two years from discovery of the wrong).
210. An analysis of the legal remedies for civil claims of adult victims of
extrafamilial sexual abuse (such as in a pre-school setting) exceeds the scope of
this Note. The proposed statute is drafted narrowly to encompass only the claims
of victims of incest abuse. Similarly, it is not suggested that the former class of
claims lack merit. Rather, the purpose of the proposed statute is to address the
unique circumstances and attendant injuries of incestuous abuse, which include
the heightened emotional trauma often resulting from compelled sexual activity
between family members and the frequently long-term duration of such sexual
conduct. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1987) (penal
law article 35 recognizes the defense of justification and posits an objective and
subjective inquiry for determining self-defense). Section 35.15 provides: "[A]
person may . . .use physical force upon another person when and to the extent
he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself . . . from what
he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force
by such other person." Id. (emphasis added); see also People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d
96, 107, 497 N.E.2d 41, 47, 506 N.Y.S.2d 18, 24 (1986) (construing "reasonably
believes" in § 35.15 to require consideration of circumstances of the incident to
determine "whether the defendant's conduct was that of a reasonable man in
the defendant's situation"). The standard is thus that of a reasonable person in
the defendant's situation, and the background and other relevant characteristics
of a particular actor will not be ignored. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d at 114, 497 N.E.2d
at 52, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 29. By analogy, the standard under the proposed statute
should be a reasonable person in the incest victim's situation.
212. One author has noted the tendency of some jurisdictions to "couple a
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(a) As used in this section,. the term "incest" is not limited to
the meaning specified in section 255.25 of the New York Penal
Law213 but shall also include any unwanted sexual contact with
a family member.
21 4
(b) As used in this section, "abuse" shall be defined as (1) any
pattern of unwanted sexual contact which may be characterized
as ongoing, or continuing or (2) any singular episode of unwanted
sexual contact, sufficiently traumatic in the means of commis-
sion.3 1
At least two compelling reasons support this proposed legislation.
First, the common law doctrines and statutory tolling provisions
regarding statutes of limitations have thus far failed to achieve the
results that could be obtained by the legislative enactment of a
discovery rule for incest-based tort claims. 21 6 The purpose of uni-
formity would be served if the law were no longer applied on an
ad hoc basis. Similarly, legislative action has the decisive advantage
in this particular area of precluding erroneous construction and
misapplication of law with the tragic result of foreclosing a worthy
plaintiff from proceeding to the merits of her claim. Second,
legislation has the effect of administrative convenience. This pro-
posal supplies a durable solution to a complex issue that otherwise
would consume much judicial energy. Moreover, a legislative so-
lution is in keeping with the policies and purposes behind statutes
of limitations in New York. 21 7
liberal statute of limitations, usually including a discovery provision, with a statute
of repose that creates an absolute outer cut-off date from the time of the wrongful
act." Exception or the Law?, supra note 16, at 521; see also Epstein, supra note
84, 1183 n.19.
While it is beyond the scope of this Note, a statute of repose of perhaps ten
to fifteen years (which serves to eliminate the cause of action) coupled with a
latent injury exception for incest victims may strike a balance between prompt
claim resolution on the one hand and the unwarranted foreclosure of meritorious
causes of action on the other.
213. New York Penal Law § 255.25 provides that: "[a] person is guilty of
incest when he marries or engages in sexual intercourse with a person whom he
knows to be related to him, either legitimately or illegitimately, as an ancestor,
descendant, brother or sister of either the whole or the half blood, uncle, aunt,
nephew or niece." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.25 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1986).
214. For a definition of "family member," see supra note 1.
215. Some means of commission of incest abuse are so patently traumatic to
the child that they may not have to occur again to constitute compensable injury.
See Wilbur, The Effect of Child Abuse on the Psyche, in CHILDHOOD ANTECEDENTS
OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY 21 (R. Kluft ed. 1985).
216. See supra notes 175-200 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
1987]
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V. Conclusion
A strict application of the statute of limitations for negligence
and intentional tort does not afford adequate protection to victims
of childhood incest abuse litigating as adults. A rational inter-
pretation of those statutes presupposes a type of injury that is
readily apparent, while injuries from incest abuse may not manifest
themselves until years after the abuse actually ceases. Diagnosis
of injuries resulting from incest abuse may not occur until even
later. Considerations of fairness suggest that a policy of allowing
the defendant to repose should not overcome the legitimate claim
of a blamelessly ignorant plaintiff. When the adult victim of child-
hood incest abuse has repressed all conscious memory of the abuse
or is otherwise unable to file suit because of the defendant's mis-
conduct, then, in addition to attempting to utilize the doctrines of
equitable estoppel, duress and the statutory tolling exception for
mental disability, the plaintiff should be afforded the benefit of a
discovery rule. To this end, the New York Legislature should enact
a discovery rule applicable to incest-based tort claims that would
redress a fundamental inequity and hardship that is worked upon
adult victims of childhood incest abuse when traditional rules of
accrual are applied to their civil claims.
Carolyn B. Handler
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